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Controversies over stakeholder participation in marine protected area 1 
(MPA) management: a case study of the Cabo de Palos- Islas Hormigas MPA 2 
ABSTRACT 3 
There is considerable controversy over the role of stakeholder participation (SP) in the management of 4 
marine protected areas (MPAs). On the one hand, SP advocates claim that successful MPAs make use 5 
of SP in their design and management. . On the other hand, SP critics  argue that it is difficult to reach 6 
consensus between stakeholders on the need for MPAs, let alone the best way to manage them. This 7 
study aimed to investigate the extent of SP in the Cabo de Palos-Islas Hormigas MPA (CPH-MPA) in 8 
the Murcia province of south-eastern Spain, with a view to exploring this controversy. The research 9 
focused on the perceptions of respondents on the value of SP in CPH-MPA decision-making; the 10 
current extent of SP in the CPH-MPA; the challenges to it; and ways of overcoming those challenges. 11 
Fieldwork was carried out during 2013-2015 involving the collection of qualitative data from key 12 
informant interviews, community meetings, and individual surveys. These is data revealed a high 13 
degree of support for SP; very different perceptions about its current extent in CPH-MPA; the existence 14 
of many barriers to SP; and several recommendations to address these barriers. The study concluded 15 
that since immediate consensus on SP was absent, an experimental approach of adaptive co-16 
management (ACM) could be adopted to determine what kind of SP works best.       17 
 18 
Keywords: Stakeholder participation (SP); Cofradía; Resource users; Governance; Marine 19 
Protected Areas (MPA).  20 
1 Introduction 21 
The complexities of socio-ecological relationships make it crucial to examine conservation 22 
problems hand-in-hand with societal contexts, including local interests and perceptions (Voyer et al., 23 
2012). In response to these complexities, there has been for many years considerable support in the 24 
literature and policy communities for stakeholder engagement in coastal fisheries management 25 
(Delaney et al., 2007; Mikalsen and Jentoft, 2001; Nenadovic and Epstein, 2016). Supporters claim that 26 
stakeholder participation (SP) in marine coastal management facilitates representation of diverse views 27 
and values; provides local knowledge and solutions tailored to specific contexts; prepares the ground 28 
for more effective implementation of policies for long-term management (Berghöfer et al., 2008; Pita 29 
et al., 2010); and legitimises marine resource governance (EU, 2013; Hogg et al., 2013; Nenadovic and 30 
Epstein, 2016). Indeed, advocates of SP assert that there is ample evidence to show that it is social 31 
factors and people’s perceptions that are the primary determinants of the success or failure of marine 32 
protected areas (MPAs) (Blount and Pitchon, 2007; Christie, 2004; Kelleher and Recchia, 1998; 33 
Mascia, 2004). However, opponents of SP urge caution in giving weight to community views in 34 
conservation management decisions, on grounds that high levels of bottom-up SP are unsuitable given 35 
the ecological issues that MPAs entail (Jones, 2014; West et al., 2006; Wilkie et al., 2006). These 36 
critics opponents of SP argue for a science-based, top-down approach, involving ‘preservationist’ or 37 
no-take solutions, which could be put at risk by excessive SP (Jones, 2014).  38 
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This theoretical controversy is reflected in practice, in that despite the efforts of its advocates, 39 
the extent of SP in the management of MPAs appears to be diminishing rather than growing, and 40 
currently there seems to be a trend away from the more active, towards the more passive, modes of SP 41 
in decision-making (Berkes, 2009; Gray and Hatchard, 2003; Nutters and Pinto da Silva, 2012). 42 
However, this trend is causing a backlash amongst stakeholders who are very dissatisfied with their 43 
current level of participation in MPA decision-making processes, criticising their lack of involvement 44 
in management decisions and in scientific assessments upon which those decisions are made, and 45 
deploring the negligible recognition and respect that is given to their knowledge (Delaney et al., 2007; 46 
Nielsen et al., 2004; Pita et al., 2010; Yates, 2014). It may be that scale is a significant factor in 47 
resolving this controversy – i.e. that SP is less appropriate and certainly more complex in large-scale 48 
MPAs on the high seas than in small-scale MPAs close to coastal communities (O'Leary et al., 2012). 49 
But even if SP is deemed appropriate in small-scale MPAs, there is still controversy over the kind of 50 
SP that a particular small-scale MPA should have. This is the issue with the present study of the Cabo 51 
de Palos-Islas Hormigas (CPH-MPA) in Spain, which is a small-scale MPA in a community that is 52 
strongly in favour of SP, but deeply divided over the type of SP that should exist.  53 
The aim of the study is to investigate this issue in the CPH-MPA by examining the 54 
perceptions expressed by respondents about, first, the value of SP; second, the extent of SP in decision-55 
making in CPH-MPA; third, the obstacles to such participation; and fourth, ways of improving it. 56 
Ecological studies show the CPH-MPA to be an ecological success and that protection has resulted in 57 
an increase in the abundance and biomass of numerous commercially important species, and a recovery 58 
of the marine ecosystem (Felix-Hackradt et al., 2013; García-Charton et al., 2004; Hackradt et al., 59 
2014). The reason why the CPH-MPA was chosen for this study is because, while it has conserved 60 
marine resources, it has not been successful in meeting its socio-economic objectives, and arguably this 61 
is because it lacks the right kind of SP in its decision-making structures. The original contribution of 62 
this paper is that it adds to the growing sense that while in principle SP is an important part of good 63 
governance for fisheries management in general, and MPA management in particular, there is 64 
considerable variation in the types of SP that could be instituted, as well as a wide variety of opinions 65 
among stakeholders about the type of SP they would prefer. The paper’s recommendation that an 66 
experimental approach to adaptive co-management (ACM) should be introduced into the CPH-MPA, 67 
reflects a view that is increasingly found in the literature that each MPA is unique (Pomeroy et al., 68 
2004) and that its stakeholders should be allowed to choose the form of SP that suits them best (Fox et 69 
al., 2013; Nutters and Pinto da Silva, 2012; Reed, 2008).  70 
In section 2, the case study’s background is described. In section 3, the research methods used 71 
in this study are explained. In section 4, the results of the data are presented, and in section 5, these 72 
data are discussed for their insight into the four main issues in this study: the worth of SP; its current 73 
extent; barriers to it; and ways of improving it. In section 6, there is a list of recommendations for 74 
dealing with these issues. 75 
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2 Case study background 76 
Cabo de Palos (pop. ~1200 (INE, 2015)) is a small village in Murcia, south-east Spain, which 77 
has a strong fishing heritage, but has recently become a popular tourist hotspot because of its legendary 78 
SCUBA diving attractions. The CPH-MPA (see Figure 1.), which is located at 37°39N, 0°26W, 79 
covering 19km2, was established in  1995 by the Spanish government.  As one of the country’s first 80 
marine reserves, the designation, implementation and decision-making processes were a learning 81 
experience for all involved. For two years before its establishment, intense and often ‘hard’ discussions 82 
took place to establish the conditions of use of the reserve. The views of the cofradía appeared to 83 
prevail, since the CPH-MPA is a marine reserve of fisheries interest (MRFI) equivalent to an IUCN 84 
category VI MPA (Dudley et al., 2013), with an integral (category Ia) no-take zone. However, the 85 
objectives of CPH-MPA as described in its official terms of reference are not only to protect, 86 
regenerate and develop fishing resources for the maintenance of sustainable fisheries enabling artisanal 87 
fishermen in the area to preserve their traditional way of life, but also to support other low-impact 88 
activities (for example SCUBAscuba-diving and environmental education) that contribute to economic 89 
development in the area (BOE, 2010). The initial reaction of the fishers was reportedly one of fear 90 
regarding the loss of access to valuable fishing grounds and the ban on certain fishing gears. However, 91 
gradually the fishers reported seeing a return of groupers that had been eliminated by illegal fishers and 92 
began to have confidence in the reserve. But later, the fishers felt deceived as the use of the reserve 93 
shifted in favour of divers, and the initial agreements made with fishers regarding the use of the reserve 94 
were ignored. 95 
The artisanal fishing fleet is small, and like other small-scale fishing fleets in the 96 
Mediterranean has been undergoing gradual decline (Fabio et al., 2016; Gómez et al., 2006). In 1993, 97 
there were 14 active vessels; 10 in 2010 when the reserve census was last modified (Esparza, 2010); 98 
and six at the time of study. To be included in the reserve census, artisanal vessels must have been 99 
operating in the area of the reserve for four years before the enactment of the marine reserve order 100 
(BOE, 2010). The system does not permit the addition of any new vessels to the census or the transfer 101 
of licences between vessels, so if a vessel is no longer seaworthy and a new boat is purchased, that 102 
fisher is not permitted to continue fishing in the reserve with the newly acquired vessel- the licence 103 
belongs to the vessel. If the boat is retired, the licence is lost, though another individual may buy a 104 
licenced boat and use it to fish in the reserve. These six vessels currently provide employment to 13 105 
full-time fishers, and several part-time employees. The artisanal fishers from CPH-MPA belong to the 106 
second largest cofradía in the region - Cartagena (54 boats). Cofradías are local non-profit corporations 107 
with public rights, which represent the interests of the whole fishing sector by acting “as consultative 108 
and cooperative bodies for the administration, undertaking economic, administrative and commercial 109 
management tasks and with the ability to cooperate in matters of regulating access to the resources and 110 
informing over infractions occurring in their territory” (Pascual-Fernández, 1999):71. As in other 111 
regions, there is a strong tradition of  ‘family fishing’ (Herrera-Racionero et al., 2015): almost 80% of 112 
the fleet in the CPH-MPA have familial links, and strong familial links also exist with the patron mayor 113 
(who is director of the cofradía). Within the reserve, the only fishing gears that are permitted are 114 
trammel nets and long line. Since the creation of CPH-MPA, the SCUBA diving industry has grown 115 
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substantially with nine dive centres operating at the time of study. These dive centres provided full-116 
time employment to 38-40 ‘permanent’ employees, and many additional part-time posts during the 117 
peak season. Since the SCUBA diving industry is relatively new, unlike the fishing industry it does not 118 
have a well-recognised and respected representative organisation.   119 
With regard to the management system of MPAs in Spain, the country aims to balance the 120 
top-down authority of the national and regional governments with the bottom-up organisation of 121 
fishermen within cofradías (Alegret, 1999; Herrera-Racionero et al., 2015). This may suggest a co-122 
management regime, but in practice, the national government plays the dominant role in the 123 
management of fisheries, with some functions being devolved to the regional governments, and a 124 
consultative role given to the cofradias, vessel owners' associations, producers' organisations, and the 125 
unions (Suárez de Vivero and Frieyro de Lara, 1997). Theoretically, cofradías play an important role in 126 
participatory management systems, helping to define needs and to channel aid within the sector 127 
(Bavinck et al., 2015), but the bargaining power of cofradías varies regionally (Jentoft et al., 2012; 128 
Pascual-Fernández, 1999). Some cofradías have played an important role in the implementation of 129 
MPAs: for example, La Restinga - Canary Islands (Revenga, 2003), Lira - Galicia (Perez de Oliveira, 130 
2013), and L’Estartit, and Medes Islands - Catalonia (Ballester-Nolla, 2008). But elsewhere, the 131 
growing influence of other organisations in the fisheries sector has reduced their bargaining power.  132 
There is a complicated (even opaque) relationship between the national, regional, and 133 
community spheres of responsibility for management of the CPH-MPA. The CPH-MPA is managed at 134 
national level by the National Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Environment and at regional level by 135 
the Council of Agriculture and Water of the Region of Murcia. These two institutions are collectively 136 
referred to as ‘the administration’ or ‘management’ throughout this paper. A formal framework 137 
agreement outlines the collaboration and shared management responsibility of each body with regard to 138 
the CPH-MPA. For example, the two administrations are jointly responsible for protecting the marine 139 
environment, regenerating commercially valuable fish stocks, providing and maintaining a reserve 140 
office, and ensuring monitoring, research, information and outreach. The national administration has a 141 
duty to provide beaconing, signalling, and a surveillance vessel, while the regional ministry has to 142 
contribute an additional surveillance vessel. This collaboration is overseen by a formal monitoring 143 
committee, which includes representatives from both the national and regional ministries, which are 144 
supposed to meet annually to review progress. An ad hoc advisory board, which supports the 145 
management of the MPA, is composed of representatives from the administration, research institutions, 146 
municipalities, environmental organisations, fisheries sector (i.e. cofradía representatives, trade union 147 
representatives, and recreational fishing representatives), relevant marine business organisations, and a 148 
representative of the federation of underwater activities in the region of Murcia.  149 
3 Methods 150 
3.1 Data collection     151 
Fieldwork was carried out during 2013-2014 involving the collection and analysis of data from: survey 152 
questionnaires (SQs), key informant interviews (KIs), observation, community meetings, and literature 153 
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review. The target population for the survey questionnaires included : resource users (17 fishers, both 154 
active and recently retired, and 37 full-time employees of SCUBA dive centres); and for the semi-155 
structured interviews with key informants (KIs) included three government officers, four researchers, 156 
two fisheries sector representatives, two SCUBA diving sector representatives and two NGO 157 
representatives. Respondents were targeted through opportunistic and snowball sampling (Bryman, 158 
2012) from July to September 2013. Out of the 59 resource users identified as being eligible to 159 
participate in the fieldwork, 5 refused, giving a response rate of 92%. All targeted KIs responded. 160 
Gender distribution of resource users interviewed was 91% male and 9% female. The fishing sector in 161 
Cabo de Palos is characteristically dominated by males, which is a common trend, though women play 162 
a significant part in other fisheries such as in Lira- (Perez de Oliveira, 2013). The female resource users 163 
were all employees within the dive industry. Community respondents were 56% male and 44% female. 164 
Before the main fieldwork, a pilot study helped validate the survey layout and question phrasing. Table 165 
1 provides the questions asked which comprised opinions on the current management of the MPA and 166 
the marine environment, how decisions are made, what opportunities for participation exist, and how 167 
information about decisions taken is communicated. As part of a wider study, the survey questionnaire 168 
also covered issues of environmental change, environmental management, and social capital, and 169 
gathered household and demographic information from resource users. Trained research assistants 170 
along with the first author conducted interviews and gathered field notes. Observation was used in two 171 
main ways during the research period: by the lead author as a non-participant observer of interactions 172 
between different stakeholders; and by two of the co-authors as participants in CPH-MPA management 173 
meetings. From direct experience, these two decision-making meetings followed the format of 174 
informing/consulting, where some decisions had already been taken before prior to the meeting was 175 
held, yet some opportunity was provided for resource users to declare whether  or not they agreed with 176 
the decisions. or not. In general the different actors were given little opportunity to voice their opinion 177 
and it was unclear as to whether their input would be considered when taking the final decisions. Three 178 
community validation and feedback meetings were held between 2013 and 2014, allowing for open 179 
discussion around key issues topics arising yielded from the results; additional data to be collected 180 
through participative exercises; clarification of contradictory and confusing results; and validation and 181 
triangulation of the data.   182 
3.2 Data analysis  183 
Audio recordings and field notes were transcribed verbatim, and professionally translated 184 
from Spanish to English. Qualitative data were organized using Nvivo10 analysis software (QSR, 185 
2012). Some themes were identified from perceptions of participation levels and of barriers to 186 
participation identified in the literature, but most themes were chosen through an inductive process of 187 
reading and re-reading the completed survey questionnaires and KI interview transcripts, identifying 188 
repeated words and themes within and between respondents, and grouping the codes generated into 189 
collections of similar content (Bryman, 2012). This technique, borrowed from grounded theory (Glaser 190 
and Strauss, 1967), allows issues to arise out of the data, rather than from pre-conceived assumptions.  191 
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4 Results 192 
There are four main topics themes in this Results section: respondents’ perceptions of (1) the 193 
value of SP; (2) types of SP; (3) obstacles to SP; and (4) ways of improving SP.  194 
4.1 Value of SP in CPH-MPA 195 
There was strong support for SP expressed by most respondents. What follows is a sample of 196 
their comments. Fishers and the cofradía said that what is needed is: “a good management from the 197 
bottom up.” They wanted management to take more account of the views of fishers and of divers. 198 
Some fishers expressed strong resentment at their exclusion from decisions that affected them and their 199 
families’ lives: “I don’t know why three or four men from the European Commission have to decide 200 
over my future or the future of my children, but that’s the reality.” Divers said that marine resource 201 
users should be allowed to participate in management decision-making: while management should 202 
manage, it should do so consensually, with the agreement of fishers and divers. NGO representatives 203 
said there was a need for decisions to be made “from the bottom up.” Researchers said that the quality 204 
of government decisions would improve if people with practical knowledge of the sea participated in 205 
making them. When asked if they would like the opportunity to participate or have greater participation 206 
in CPH-MPA management decision-making processes, 82% of fishers and 91% of divers agreed, 207 
saying that they had much local knowledge to offer and a desire to do what is right for the future well-208 
being of the reserve.  209 
4.2 Types of SP occurring in CPH-MPA 210 
Resource users were asked to respond to a series of statements using a Likert scale regarding 211 
their level of participation in the MPA, and whether or not they thought that MPAs take their opinions 212 
into account  (Table 2). On the level of participation, 44% of fishers agreed they were informed, 213 
whereas  versus 62% of divers who claimed not to be informed. For higher levels of SP, both fishers 214 
and divers reported levels of disagreement above 55%. Both groups were found to perceive MPAs as 215 
being more considerate of users’ opinions. 216 
Respondents perceived five six types of SP in CPH-MPA, ranging from a less active level to a 217 
more active level (Gray, 2005; Nutters and Pinto da Silva, 2012). This spectrum, which has been 218 
adapted from the typologies compiled by five influential writers (Arnstein, 1969; Bouamrane, 2006; 219 
Lawrence, 2006; Pimbert and Pretty, 1997; Pretty, 1995), contains the following types of SP: passivity; 220 
communication; consultation; influence; and collaboration. This is a descriptive, not a normative 221 
spectrum: it distinguishes between less active and more active SP, but it does not make the assumption 222 
that less active is bad and more active is good.  223 
4.2.1 Passivity 224 
The least active form of SP is passivity, which incorporates negligible SP. Many respondents 225 
held that the CPH-MPA was managed by a system , which afforded virtually no opportunity for SP. 226 
For example, fishers said: “They don’t let us take part”; “Madrid decides, gives orders and it’s done.” 227 
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A cofradía representative remarked that: “it would seem that we went back to Franco times when you 228 
do what they tell you to do and that’s all.” A researcher said: “There are no chances of participation.”  229 
4.2.2 Communication 230 
The next level of SP mentioned by respondents was communication. Some fishers 231 
acknowledged that they received communication from management. For example, one cofradía 232 
representative said that: “The Fisheries Service informs us too whenever they offer some aids for 233 
fishermen, etc.” Likewise, a diver said: “We, users of marine resources are being informed about the 234 
management.” Managers maintained that they regularly directed flows of information to fishers. 235 
However, many fishers said they were not given information by management: “We receive zero 236 
information from the bodies”; “once the decisions are made they don’t explain them.”  Moreover, the 237 
cofradía representative said the regional management (though not the national management) ignored 238 
their attempts to communicate with them: “the National Ministry does reply whenever we appeal some 239 
piece of legislation or report, even if it’s just to say no to our proposal. At least they reply when we ask 240 
something. On the other hand in the Region, they don’t even bother to reply with a yes or a no.” 241 
Another fisher said: “I have complained many times in Cartagena but they don't reply.” A diver 242 
asserted that the regional administration sometimes took years to respond to their communications. 243 
Another controversial issue of communication was over the existence of meetings between marine 244 
users and marine managers. These findings were corroborated by an exercise undertaken in community 245 
feedback meetings, which explored resources users’ perceived accessibility to different institutions 246 
involved in the management of the MPA. The results revealed that both administrations were placed in 247 
positions that revealed them to be inaccessible, yet,  despite the physical distance between the resource 248 
users and the national ministry in Madrid, resource users perceived the national ministry as being more 249 
accessible than the regional. Another controversial issue of communication was over the existence of 250 
meetings between marine users and marine managers. Some fishers acknowledged that regular 251 
meetings took did take place with both national and regional management, and administrators 252 
confirmed this. Researchers and NGO representatives also said there were meetings between fishers 253 
and managers. However, many fishers complained about a lack of meetings: “No meetings are held”; 254 
“Neither the Fisheries Service nor Madrid have ever held a meeting with us, the fisheries sector.”  255 
4.2.3 Consultation  256 
The next level of SP identified by respondents was consultation. Many respondents said there 257 
was consultation. Indeed, a cofradía representative said: “Every time the administration is going to 258 
make some new agreement or project they call us and they consult us.” A diver said that: “Usually we 259 
are consulted for the regulation, same with fishermen.” National administrators claimed the 260 
government not only honoured its obligation to consult all MPA stakeholders but that: “decisions are 261 
adopted after consultation, evaluation and almost negotiation with them… they are taken into 262 
consideration.” However, some respondents complained that such consultation was hollow. For 263 
example, an NGO representative said: “It might be called a consulting or a dialogue but it’s not a real 264 
decision making kind of participation.”  265 
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4.2.4  Influence 266 
The next level of SP identified by respondents was influence. Several respondents perceived 267 
that they exerted some influence on management. For example, a cofradía representative said: “We 268 
don’t make decisions, we depend on the administration. But if they ask us for information we can have 269 
some influence.” A diver said: “they [management] begin to take our opinion into consideration.” An 270 
NGO representative claimed that: “many projects have been stopped thanks to this and other 271 
organizations.” On the other hand, many respondents perceived their level of influence in CPH-MPA 272 
decision-making processes to be low. For example, a cofradía representative said: “[Fishers have] very 273 
little influence because they [the administration] don’t contact the cofradía.” A diver said: “we have no 274 
pressure and there is no way to channel the real interests to confront the wall imposed by the 275 
administration.” 276 
4.2.5  Collaboration   277 
The strongest kind of participation alluded to by respondents was collaboration. Some 278 
respondents claimed there was a healthy form of collaborative management in CPH-MPA. For 279 
example, a national administrator claimed that it was virtually co-management: “Cabo de Palos is a 280 
very interesting example of collaboration… we are in a joint venture of mutual benefit... It’s been done 281 
hand in hand with them [fishers]...  25 years ago it wasn’t called co-management but it’s a model 282 
based 100% on the idea of co-management.” A regional administrator referred to: “a management 283 
committee for the reserve with several actors involved such as the fisheries sector, the State General 284 
Administration, the Regional Administration, the Town Hall of Cartagena, Tourism, Diving, etc.” On 285 
the other hand, some fishers said there was no desire among management for collaboration, and so-286 
called collaborative arrangements were a sham. 287 
4.3 Obstacles to SP in CPH-MPA 288 
Section 4.2 has revealed that there were very contrasting views among respondents about the 289 
types and extent of SP in the management decision-making of the CPH-MPA. Some respondents 290 
perceived significant amounts of communication, consultation, influence, and collaboration; while 291 
others perceived relatively little of any of these forms of SP, or, where they did exist, they were seen as 292 
tokenistic. Both these sets of respondents expressed opinions about how the quality of SP could be 293 
improved. In this section, we consider seven types of obstacle to the quality of SP that were mentioned 294 
by respondents. In the next section, we consider several ways of improving the quality of SP that were 295 
suggested by respondents.  296 
4.3.1 Lack of administrative will 297 
The most frequently expressed obstacle to SP was administrators’ lack of will. One researcher 298 
referred to: “an absolute lack of will to incorporate actors in management and to yield part of their 299 
decision power; I think this is a problem of management attitude or culture, which is very old, and not 300 
in tune with the current times.” One reason for regional administrators’ indifference to SP according to 301 
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a researcher is that all decisions are taken in Madrid: “the authorities from Murcia tend to follow 302 
blindly the national policies; there is no will to do something that hasn’t been dictated from Madrid.” 303 
Another reason, according to a fisher, is aversion to conflict: “they don’t convene any meetings to 304 
avoid conflicts and they give us excuses.” An NGO representative corroborated this claim: “the 305 
administrations… fear social opposition, for example from the fisheries sector, when it comes to 306 
implementing marine reserves.” One respondent alleged that administrators were corrupt, and more 307 
preoccupied with lining their pockets than with improving the quality of CPH-MPA governance. Some 308 
respondents inferred that there was lack of commitment on both sides - the administration failed to 309 
provide a platform for participation, while fishers failed to collaborate. This joint failure is a finding 310 
supported by previous studies (Hollup, 2000; Jentoft and McCay, 1995). 311 
4.3.2 Lack of funding   312 
Another obstacle to SP was perceived to be lack of money- a common issue for MPAs 313 
(Berghöfer et al., 2008; Nutters and Pinto da Silva, 2012; Pomeroy et al., 2001). An administrator said: 314 
“Meetings are held periodically to get to know their opinion and consider management alternatives but 315 
due to the budget situation this is halted at the moment.” Meetings for SP entail travel costs, and cuts 316 
to public expenditure meant such costs could no longer be met by government. 317 
4.3.3  Fishers’ low status 318 
Another obstacle to SP was perceived to be the poor status that fishers had in the eyes of 319 
managers and researchers (Hollingshead, 2011; Hollup, 2000; McGoodwin, 1995), who regarded 320 
fishers as inferior, using terms like “uneducated”, “cheats”, “closed minds”, and “lazy” to describe 321 
them. A cofradía representative said: “They come and make claims against us, they say we are 322 
predators… at the European level Brussels speaks of the fisheries sector as criminals.” Some fishers 323 
internalised these prejudices, as an NGO representative remarked: “when fishermen sit to talk with 324 
managers they feel inferior.” The fishers’ poor level of education may be a contributory cause of their 325 
poor status and low self-esteem: 65% had primary school level education, 18% secondary school, and 326 
only 18% college level. A diver (divers had a higher level of education - 9% primary; 9% secondary; 327 
14% technical/professional; 30% college; and 38% university) said: “fishing is an activity for people 328 
who cannot study, who didn't have that chance.” A researcher said: “because they have little education, 329 
and this is typical of Spain, they think that going and talking to an administrator and telling them 330 
what’s happening is something beyond their ability.”  331 
4.3.4  Lack of respect for managers  332 
Another perceived obstacle to SP was the lack of respect that resource users felt for the 333 
authorities. Fishers had little confidence in the knowledge of fisheries managers: “The problem we have 334 
in Murcia [regional ministry] is that the people in charge of the administration are people whose 335 
speciality is not this.” A diver said: “Management is bad because decisions are taken in an office not 336 
knowing what's going on here.” 337 
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4.3.5 Dispute over science  338 
Another perceived obstacle to SP was a dispute over the evidence used to make decisions 339 
(Coll et al., 2014; Mackinson et al., 2011). Fishers claimed that data collected by fisheries scientists 340 
was flawed. Other respondents lamented the fact that fishers’ ecological knowledge – i.e. fishers’ 341 
contribution to fisheries science - was ignored by managers. For example, a researcher said: “they 342 
[fishers] have an incredible knowledge of the matter and this traditional knowledge is not taken into 343 
consideration when decisions are made.” This conflict reflects the classic tension between positivist 344 
scientific knowledge and experiential fisher’s local ecological knowledge (Nielsen et al., 2004; 345 
Pálsson, 1995), which reinforces the barrier between management and fishers.  346 
4.3.6 Failure of the cofradía to represent fishers 347 
Another perceived obstacle to SP was the failure of the cofradía to represent fishers 348 
effectively in their relationship to fisheries authorities. When fishers were asked from whom they 349 
received information, only two out of seventeen (12%) reported the cofradía as the source. Three 350 
reasons explain this disconnect between artisanal fishers and the cofradía: first, although cofradías 351 
represent both artisanal and industrial fishing, the latter generate the majority of the institution’s 352 
income; second, there is evidence that some individuals have used cofradías as instruments to further 353 
their personal interests, suggestive of the ‘tyranny of localism’ (Lane and Corbett, 2005; Pascual-354 
Fernández, 1999); and third, cofradías lack staff with sufficient technical and promotional skills 355 
(Alegret, 2000; Bavinck et al., 2015). The patron mayor of the cofradía himself is not a fisher, which 356 
has had some effect on the confidence the fishers feel towards their representative. Several 357 
respondents, including fishers and researchers, indicated that the cofradía was not particularly effective 358 
in achieving its objectives and suggested that the patron mayor and those with responsibility to best 359 
represent the fishers lacked the necessary leadership and skills to drive change and generate motivation. 360 
These deficiencies chime with findings on other fishers’ organisations (Hollup, 2000; Jentoft et al., 361 
2010; Nutters and Pinto da Silva, 2012; Suarez de Vivero et al., 2008; Yates, 2014). 362 
4.3.7 Personal and sectoral conflicts 363 
The final perceived obstacle to SP was the high level of personal and sectoral conflicts, both 364 
within and between stakeholder groups (Jones, 2014). Throughout the fieldwork, there was substantial 365 
evidence of underlying personal conflicts, which impeded communication and participation in 366 
decision-making processes within and between sectors. For example, a researcher said: “fishermen are 367 
unable of getting together to write a proposal because they have conflicts amongst themselves, they 368 
mistrust each other because of old issues related to fishing, they don’t know how to cooperate.” An 369 
NGO representative said that: “within the fisheries sector people are at odds with each other.” There 370 
was also evidence of conflicts between sectors, especially between fishers and divers and between 371 
resources users and the administration. A diver said: “Fishermen… are a special group because they 372 
think the sea is theirs and it’s difficult to communicate and collaborate with them.”   373 
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4.4 Ways of improving SP in CPH-MPA 374 
Several ways of improving SP were proposed by respondents. First, self-governance by 375 
resource users was suggested. For example, a researcher said: “I befriend fishermen and have always 376 
told them that they should have had a more active participation in the reserve, even managing the 377 
entrance of divers.” An NGO representative agreed, saying fishers: “should be the primary managers 378 
of the resource.” Second, an NGO representative proposed co-management: “I would like to establish 379 
processes of co-management so that users and the community can take part in the decisions.” Third, 380 
another NGO representative proposed: “creating measures that make public participation mandatory.” 381 
Fourth, a researcher proposed a round table: “there is no forum or round table to work, that’s where 382 
the management policy should be created... if you don’t participate in the round table things are often 383 
decided from behind.” Fifth, a national administrator proposed that funding should be restored to 384 
management budgets to finance SP. Sixth, a fisher proposed that meetings should be automatically held 385 
before management measures were drawn up:  “I think before creating a management plan they should 386 
meet with us, with the professionals of the fisheries sector, seek our advice about what and when to 387 
fish.” 388 
5 Discussion 389 
From the above results, three main themes emerged for discussion.  390 
5.1 Why the wide variation in perceptions of SP?  391 
First, why was there such wide variation in stakeholders’ perceptions about the actual extent 392 
of SP in the management of the CPH-MPA? Even stakeholders within the same group (such as fishers) 393 
perceived different kinds of SP operating. One explanation might be that they interpreted the meaning 394 
of SP in different ways, so where one respondent saw SP, another would not (Nutters and Pinto da 395 
Silva, 2012). However, this explanation cannot account for the fact that respondents differed over 396 
whether or not an agreed kind of SP took place. For example, they differed over whether or not there 397 
were meetings held between fishers and administrators. Why do many respondents claim there were no 398 
meetings between fishers and administrators, whereas many other respondents claim there were such 399 
meetings? One reason may be that because resource users resented their exclusion from meetings, they 400 
exaggerated the extent of that exclusion, while administrators resented criticism for failing to arrange 401 
meetings, and so exaggerated the extent to which meetings took place. Another explanation for the 402 
divergence of views on the extent of SP may be the partial perspectives that most respondents have of 403 
the CPH-MPA. For example, many artisanal fishers are independent and lone workers who keep 404 
themselves to themselves and prefer to spend their time at sea rather than in meetings (McGoodwin, 405 
1995). Accordingly, many of them may have limited knowledge of how fisheries management 406 
decisions are actually reached. Likewise, many managers spend most of their time in their offices and 407 
do not venture much out into the practical world of fishers. Accordingly, many of them may have 408 
limited first-hand knowledge of whether and how fishers perceive they are excluded from contributing 409 
to fisheries management decision-making (Herrera-Racionero et al., 2015). An administrator admitted 410 
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that their knowledge of the dive industry is very scant: “that’s beyond our competency.” The result is 411 
that each side has a sketchy perception of the activities of the other side, and so different assessments 412 
of the extent of SP are hardly surprising. 413 
5.2 The obstacles to SP are adventitious  414 
All seven obstacles to SP are adventitious, not immoveable or inevitable. Three of them – lack 415 
of will; lack of funding; and dispute over science – could be overcome by more attuned and sensitive 416 
governance. Lack of will is myopic, turning a blind eye to future flashpoints. Lack of funding should 417 
stimulate innovative ways of bringing parties together inexpensively (Berghöfer et al., 2008). Dispute 418 
over science could be addressed by arranging more meetings between fishers and scientists (Mackinson 419 
et al., 2011). The remaining four obstacles - fishers’ poor status; lack of respect for managers; failure of 420 
cofradías; and personal conflicts – are largely cultural and can be overcome by increased 421 
empowerment and social capital, though this takes more time (Hogg et al., 2013). 422 
5.3 Assumption that the more SP there is, the better 423 
Much of the above discussion is premised on the view held by most respondents that SP is 424 
valuable for decision-making in the CPH-MPA, and that up to a point, the more SP there is, the better 425 
for the running of the CPH-MPA. But this is a highly controversial assumption, and one that is 426 
increasingly questioned in the literature as case studies of SP in MPAs show disappointing results 427 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Jones, 2014; Lane and Corbett, 2005; 428 
McClanahan, 2004; Saunders et al., 2007). One of the assumptions made by some respondents was that 429 
the greater the amount of SP, the greater the degree of consensus. But more SP may lead to more 430 
fractiousness being expressed rather than more consensuses being reached. Moreover, the question 431 
arises of whether there ought to be extensive SP in decision-making if it leads to attempts to undermine 432 
the obligations imposed on member states by the EU under the Habitat Directive and the Common 433 
Fisheries Policy (Jones, 2014). 434 
6 Conclusion 435 
In conclusion, this study offers five recommendations to help deal with the controversies over 436 
SP in the CPH-MPA. The real question is not whether there should be any SP in the CPH-MPA 437 
management system, since there already are some SP elements in it, and most respondents seem to 438 
believe they should be there. The real question is what kind of SP should there be, and to what extent. 439 
Our first recommendation addresses this question by proposing that since an immediate consensus is 440 
unlikely on the proper role and extent of SP, an experimental approach of adaptive management (AM) 441 
could be adopted to determine what kind of SP might work best, and how to manage expectations 442 
about the level of participative decision-making that is feasible (Fox et al., 2013; Nutters and Pinto da 443 
Silva, 2012). The remaining four recommendations are made to facilitate this experimental process. For 444 
example, our second recommendation is to initiate better communication between resource users and 445 
the administration. Good communication channels and open, on-going dialogue are necessary to 446 
overcome distrust between actors; to help fishers feed their experiential knowledge into management 447 
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decision-making (Coll et al., 2014; Damalas et al., 2015; Mackinson et al., 2011); and to enable 448 
managers to explain decisions taken and how fishers’ information has been used in them (Cvitanovic et 449 
al., 2015; Yates, 2014). To achieve this, there needs to be a reversal in the cuts in the budgets of 450 
fisheries managers allocated for stakeholder consultation processes (Berghöfer et al., 2008; Gill et al., 451 
2017; Pomeroy et al., 2001). Our third recommendation is to identify knowledge brokers (Crona and 452 
Bodin, 2006; Weiss et al., 2012) (such as the Spanish Oceanographic Institute and the universities) and 453 
encourage a two-way dialogue with fishers (Cvitanovic et al., 2015; Mackinson et al., 2011). For 454 
example, it is suggested that knowledge co-production and participatory research projects be developed 455 
to help garner increased support from fishers by including fishers’ knowledge and ensuring that 456 
research is more in line with local user needs, as has been successfully illustrated in previous studies 457 
(Leleu et al., 2012; Mackinson et al., 2011). Our fourth recommendation is capacity building (Gill et 458 
al., 2017) for every group involved, administrators and resource users, increasing their training and 459 
experience with participatory processes, to ensure more equitable participation, empowerment of the 460 
different actors, and increased confidence in the decision-making process (Alegret, 2000; Bavinck et 461 
al., 2015; Nutters and Pinto da Silva, 2012). Our fifth recommendation is to give greater attention to the 462 
selection of SP representatives, not only for the resource users but also for all other institutions 463 
involved. This would enable users to capitalize on the strength of their representatives, thereby 464 
focusing their pressure on the regional ministry, with whom travel and transportation costs associated 465 
with meetings would be lower than with the national ministry based in Madrid (Aanesen et al., 2014). 466 
These five recommendations are practical proposals designed to improve the management system for 467 
the CPH-MPA by injecting modest amounts of SP into the decision-making process. They are not 468 
intended to transform the process, but only to smooth its operations.  469 
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